Uzbekistan

The 1996 IFES survey of public opinion in Uzbekistan investigated attitudes, perceptions, knowledge, values, and behavior on wide array of topics concerning the life of the state. This analysis begins where it will end: with a summary picture of the disposition of the Uzbekistani population with regard to what their country is today and where it is going. There emerge from the totality of this data five distinct constituencies, as follows.

Our identification of five constituencies is somewhat arbitrary. One could define as many as 1830 constituencies — one per respondent — by allowing more shades of gray. But five is the minimum number of groups which, in the opinion of the analyst, retains the most important patterns of responses found in the data.

The summary profile of the Uzbekistani population was derived from these six measures, each of which is discussed in turn in following pages:

Note that the summary profile was not composed of demographic characteristics. For the issues with which this survey was most concerned, the demographic characteristics of the respondent — sex, age, ethnicity, education, income, family structure, and so forth — were shown to be rather poor "explainers" or predictors of responses. This is why demographic characteristics were not used in the construction of the five constituencies.

The "center of political gravity" in Uzbekistan is found among those who are satisfied with the changes underway in their country and satisfied with the government. But most of those dissatisfied with the manner in which the country is changing are also satisfied with the government. While there is a significant liberal opposition, wanting greater reforms, there is virtually no reactionary or reversionist opposition. This finding means a) that the government has successfully kept one potent source of opposition inside its tent, and b) that all external pressure is in one direction.

The government has defined democracy for Uzbekistan; the extraordinary degree to which Uzbekistanis say their country is already a democracy attests to this: only among the modestly-sized Gung-ho Dissidents does a vision exist of a more thoroughly democratic Uzbekistan. And while there exists a stunning consensus in favor of democracy across the country, genuine political liberalism can come into conflict with loyalty to a government with which most Uzbekistanis are satisfied, namely over the issues of dissent and respect for individual rights.

The pursuit of economic liberalism is inherently more divisive for Uzbekistan than political liberalism, in this way. The government can assert it is a democracy, and enlist the support of pro-democracy and pro-government sympathizers (as it does). But the government cannot both assert Uzbekistan is a free market economy and retain controls over economic activity. Most Uzbekistanis, however much they want economic modernity and prosperity, do not want an economy with little or no government involvement (a condition desired by 26%). Even though rather few rely on a direct government subsidies to get by financially, the desire to retain a strong government hand in guiding the economy remains strong.

Finally, there exists a fairly high degree of attention to these affairs of state in Uzbekistan. Roughly one-in-five is substantially disengaged from current events, leaving 79 percent who are fairly attentive to the media.

This report is based on public opinion data obtained in a nationwide personal interview survey with a sample which is nationally-representatrive of the adult population in Uzbekistan. 1830 interviews were conducted between December 3, 1996 and January 16; some reinterviews were conducted between January 22 and February 5 in and around Farghona due to suspicions of interviewer error; the margin of sampling error associated with a survey sample of this size is ± 2%.

This project began with an in-country assessment of the capabilities of potential contractor to conduct the interviews. The Expert Sociological Center of Tashkent was selected in a competitive bid process. The questionnaire was designed by Steven Wagner, president of QEV Analytics, and IFES regional staff, drawing heavily on questions used in previous IFES surveys in Central Asia. The questionnaire was translated by the contractor into Uzbek, Russian, and Qoraqalpoghi (a regional language found in the far West of the country, near the Aral Sea). These translations were reviewed for accuracy and fidelity to our intent by IFES staff and consultants in Wahington. In the end, 69 percent of surveys were administered in Uzbeki, 25 percent in Russian, and 6 percent in Qoraqalpoghi.

The sample design was of a stratified probability type. Uzbekistan is comprised of 12 provinces, the autonomous Qoraqalpoghistan region, and the Tashkent metropolitian area. Our objective was to conduct interviews in every province, and in end, we excluded just 4 percent of the population from participation in the survey, residing in inaccessible areas due to geography or martial law.

For each of these 14 regions, a quota for the number of interviews proportional to their share of the national population was established. Districts within provinces were selected randomly, except for 5 metropolitan areas which were included by imposition, yielding 35 primary sampling units (places of interview).

Within metropolitian areas, households were selected randomly from the roles of electricity subscription, which is very nearly universal. Those persons not residing at a fixed address were therefore excluded from the survey, as they would have been in any in-home, personal interview survey.

Outside of the metropolitan areas, settlements were selected randomly within districts, with a quota dictating the number of rural and urban interview sites; overall, 46 percent of interviews were conducted in rural settlements. Households were selected within settlements randomly from the village council household register. In all cases, the individual interviewee within a household was selected by reference to the Kish grid.

Supervisors were responsible for confirming the performance of the interviewers by reinterviewing 10 percent of households. It was this process which brought to light inconsistencies in Farghona which provoked the reinterviewing.

Data entry was accomplished by the contractor; all data analysis was performed in Washington by QEV Analytics.

Interviews by Region
Andijon	6%
Bukhoro	8%
Farghona	6%
Jizzakh	3%
Khorazm	6%
Namangan	4%
Nawoiy	6%
Qashqadaryo	9%
Qoraqalpoghiston Rep	3%
Samarqand	2%
Sirdaryo	8%
Surkhondaryo	11%
Tashkent Shahri	5%
Tashkent	24%

The first imperative for an analyst of public opinion is to not impose one’s own understanding of the way the world works upon those persons being studied. There are no contradictory responses in public opinion research; there are only the data. Cognitive dissonance exists in the mind of the analyst; contradictions are created by the analyst’s failure to fully understand what the respondents are trying to say.

Uzbekistan really puts one to the test in this regard: there is a sense of seeming unrealism to the responses in this, the first IFES survey of public opinion in Uzbekistan.

Two-thirds of the public agrees with the proposition that "it is very difficult for my family to buy enough food to eat each month" (question 55 in the appendix), and yet an equal proportion describe the current economic situation as "very" or "somewhat good" — indeed, 53 percent of those having the most difficulty affording food enough say the economy is good (question 16).

Similarly, three of four Uzbekistanis (75%) rate the "the overall quality of (their) life today" as "very good" or "fairly good" (question 8 in the appendix), including 60 percent of those who strongly agree sufficient food is hard to come by. Sixty-three percent (63%) pronounced themselves satisfied with "the situation in Uzbekistan today" (question 9), including half of those most economically in peril. These levels of professed satisfaction are extraordinarily high.

Virtually no Uzbekistanis are looking backward: fully 87 percent consider independence to have been a good thing (question 12). Yet just half say "life in Uzbekistan" has improved since independence. No matter: even 63 percent of those who report life has gotten worse consider independence to have been a good thing (question 11). Perhaps it is their degree of optimism which leads Uzbekistanis to overlook their current circumstances in rendering these judgments about their quality of life. Seventy percent (70%) say the economic situation in twelve months will be better than today, including 60 percent of the most economically at-risk (question 17). As a further sign of optimism toward the future, 70 percent believe the quality of life which will be experienced by current young people will be better than their own (question 20).

These are counter-intuitive results: normally economic hardship, gauged in this case by the specter of going hungry, depresses judgments of economic performance and satisfaction with current conditions. Perhaps there is sufficient visible evidence of reform, of positive change, that the citizens of Uzbekistan are willing to be patient with current hardships. Aye, but how then to explain the extraordinarily high degree of professed satisfaction with the performance of the government in every dimension of public service?

IFES inaugurated its socio-political barometer, a battery of questions concerning satisfaction with various aspects of government and social performance, in earlier Central Asian surveys. Never before have the results been so lopsidedly positive as in Uzbekistan. Of 12 questions, 9 registered better than 60 percent satisfaction. Only "the opportunity of citizens to affect the state" dipped below 50 percent (question 42). Normally, satisfaction with the way things are is inversely proportional to support for reform, since change threatens the good thing and reform delivers you from a bad thing. Not so in Uzbekistan, where majorities are simultaneously content with the pace of change and satisfied with the way things are.

"Please tell me whether you are completely satisfied, fairly satisfied, fairly dissatisfied, or completely dissatisfied with each of the following:"

Many Uzbekistanis are conscious of the increased opportunities which exist for citizens as the result of independence. Opportunities to participate in religious activities are judged to have increased since independence in the opinion of 94 percent. Greater possibilities for economic activity are perceived by 89 percent. However, the extent of respect for individual rights is perceived to have increased by a comparatively modest 47 percent (questions 13, 14, 15).

Another dimension in which the Uzbekistani public differs dramatically from publics in other former Soviet Republics surveyed by IFES is in the degree to which their country is perceived to have "arrived" democratically. Fully two-thirds of Uzbekistani adults (67%) report their country is democracy (question 61). An additional 13 percent believe that while Uzbekistan is not yet a democracy, it is becoming one (question 62). Very few (6%) say it is not becoming a democracy; 14 percent give no response.

So of what does democracy consist in the public’s mind? In an open-ended question, 70 percent were able to render an opinion, and just 4 percent of responses had to do with economic prosperity (question 63). The most common responses were that democracy means living in freedom (27% gave this response) or having particular liberties (23%).

Democracy as a system of government is broadly considered by Uzbekistanis to be societally beneficial. Large majorities regard democracy to benefit most persons rather than a select few (by the margin of 72% to 14%, question 65). A similar majority say democracy promotes economic solutions rather than impedes solutions (by the margin of 70% to 2%, question 64).

Other survey questions assessed public recognition of the relationship between democratic practice and government responsiveness. The proposition that "voting gives people like me a chance to influence decisions made in our country" is affirmed by 68 percent — strongly affirmed by 25 percent (question 73). Enthusiasm for voting is strongly related to support for the government: pro-democrats dissatisfied with the performance of government account for most of those who disagree that voting empowers. As a practical matter, this is important: promoting election participation needs to be pursued among those who are already pro-democracy, but are likely of the view the government can’t lose (see the description of the "Democratic Opposition," below).

The fact of government officials being obliged to stand for election is perceived by a large majority (79%) to make those officials more responsive to the public’s goals (the text of question 74 is "when government authorities must be elected by the people in order to keep their position in government, they will be more concerned with doing what the people want.") The same percentage (80%) report that "when government authorities must be elected by the people in order to keep their position in government, they will have more respect for the rights of people" (question 75).

Another dimension of political liberalism was tapped with a question on the appropriateness of politicians openly criticizing the government (question 91). This question sharply divided Uzbekistanis, with 44 percent responding that open criticism is appropriate, and 48 percent responding it is not appropriate (the actual question text was, "in your opinion, is it appropriate for politicians who disagree with the government to openly criticize the President and the Government, or are these activities not appropriate").

The development of a civil society — in particular, the emergence of societally active non-government organizations — is potentially impeded by the perception that it is inappropriate for citizens to engage in social activism outside of the arena of government. In fact, a substantial minority of Uzbekistanis (27%) do consider NGOs "inappropriate," although a majority (59%) tell us NGOs are appropriate (question 100).

The final question on political liberalism concerns the ideal number of political parties. A plurality of 33 percent prefer one party; the sum of responses indicating a preference for more than one party equals 36 percent (question 86). A modest 5 percent prefer no party, and one-quarter (26%) express no preference.

These individual measures of political liberalism have been combined into a single political typology, a task complicated by the close identification of government policy with the pursuit of democracy. In other words, these measures of political liberalism in the abstract are tainted by the respondent’s views of government in the particular.

Just as this survey sought to assess the extent of political liberalism, it separately measured several dimensions of economic liberalism. Although Uzbekistanis are not looking backward in the sense that the vast majority consider independence to have been a good thing, a majority do prefer a kind of economic reversion, with half saying, "when thinking about our economic future, we (should) return to an economy basically controlled by the state" (question 47). One-quarter (26%) prefer an economy with little state control.

When asked in an open-ended format what it means to live in a "free or market economy," 72 percent were able to give a substantive response (question 50). Forty-six percent (46%) of these responses were negative, principally that is means unemployment (19%) or low income and standards of living (14%). Half gave positive responses or descriptive responses, principally that a free market economy implies economic freedom and property rights (the response of 26%).

While democracy is seen to be broadly beneficial (by 72%, question 65), the free market economic system is not: 44 percent regard the free market economy to benefit "most people," but 48 percent report it benefits just a select few (question 51).

Taken together, these three questions constitute our basis for assessing the extent of popular economic liberalism. The statistical technique of factor analysis confirms that these three variables can legitimately be combined into a single composite measure of economic liberalism, and provides a case-by-case liberalism score.

In summary, 18 percent are scored as highly liberal, 35 percent are moderately liberal, 32 percent are moderately illiberal, 15 percent are highly illiberal. The end points are more easily described than the middle categories. None of the highly liberal want a state controlled economy; 78 percent of the highly liberal have positive things to say about a free market economy (none have negative things to say); virtually all (97%) say a market economy benefits everyone. The highly illiberal are the exact mirror image, exclusively preferring a state controlled economy, criticizing the market economy in the open-ended question, saying it benefits a select few.

The two moderate categories consist of people who gave less consistent responses. Sixty-two percent of the moderate liberal say a market economy benefits everyone; 53 percent said positive things about the market economy, while 37 percent gave no opinion; but 45 percent wanted state control of the economy, versus 24 percent for little or no state involvement in the economy.

The moderately illiberal prefer state control by 67 percent versus 10 percent for little or no state involvement in the economy. One-third of the moderately illiberal gave negative descriptions of a free market system, and most (80%) say it will benefit just a select few.

In additional to the socio-political barometer questions which measure the government’s delivery of services, two additional questions in this survey tapped opinions of the government, and both yielded similar, highly positive results.

One question concerns the efficacy of the national government (question 22), to which 78 percent responded "it is possible of the national government in Tashkent to improve significantly the lives of the citizens of Uzbekistan." Another question concerns the extent to which "government authorities respect the rights of individuals in Uzbekistan" (question 27). Fifty-seven percent (57%) responded "a great deal," or "a fair amount."

Examining the pattern of responses to the "barometric" and these two additional questions on government can yield a composite measure of professed attitudes toward the government. Statistical procedures (factor analysis) are available to indicate the extent to which these various questions belong together; that is, the extent to which these seem to measure a common, underlying sentiment. There was an extremely high degree of homogeneity of responses, suggesting either that many respondents gave a consistently "safe" response of "fairly satisfied" to each of these questions, or it may be the case a high degree of government paternalism is accepted.

Nonetheless, 39 percent expressed consistent and frequently intense satisfaction with the performance of the government. Another third (34%) expressed consistent but more tepid satisfaction. Only 28 percent expressed more dissatisfaction than satisfaction.

Summary attitudes toward the government are highly significant to other attitudes about which we are concerned. In fact, satisfaction with the government is arguably the most important composite variable we have, by the measure of its power to explain fundamental dispositions of the people on economic and political development. It is also arguably the most important factor in the real world political dynamics of Uzbekistan.

There is very little anti-government, anti-democracy sentiment in Uzbekistan today. Allowing for "grade inflation" in assessments of government performance, roughly 10 percent of the population is less than very favorably disposed toward the government and not pro-democracy. By comparison, roughly a third are less than very positive on the government and pro-democracy.

Similarly, there is a scant anti-government, anti-economic reform constituency, numbering roughly 10 percent. Most of the dissent in Uzbekistan is therefore liberal, and can be counted on to encourage further political and economic liberalization. Yet confidence in the government appears to constrain regressive agitation — the illiberal, anti-reformers are mostly inside the government’s tent. These political factors create a dynamic tending to push reform in one direction.

The government clearly benefits from the high degree of nationalist sentiment in Uzbekistan today. This survey can not claim to have exhaustively assessed nationalism, but the data available to us suggests that those with the greater degree of interest in nation-building evidence the lesser degree of dissent toward the government. This too is a significant political dynamic, since dissent which is propelled by nationalist sentiment has a distinctively unpleasant character and intensity.

To put these comments into some perspective, 23 percent rely on a government subsidy to sustain their quality of life, although only 28 percent of pensioners consider themselves dependent in this way on the government (question 56).

It follows from the high level of professed satisfaction with the situation in Uzbekistan today either that there also prevails a high level of satisfaction with the economic and political transformation underway in the country (that is, that things are changing in a positive direction) — or that there prevails a general perception things are fine as they are and nothing much is changing at all. Clearly it is not the latter perception with is most prevalent.

An astounding 82 percent report that "many things are changing in Uzbekistan today" (question 18). And only a minority hold the view that these changes are excessive (question 19). Combining the responses to these two questions reveals that a plurality of 35 percent hold that change is significant yet occurring at the appropriate pace; 27 percent think change is significant and too rapid; 17 percent think change is significant yet insufficient. Twelve percent assert change is not occurring, and 9 percent express no opinion.

Questions concerning perceptions of economic reform in Uzbekistan (as opposed to generic change in society) yield similar results, revealing a general "contented incrementalism." Over half of Uzbekistanis prefer incremental (step-by-step) economic reform (57%) rather than rapid reform (35%; question 48). Similarly, over half (52%) report the current pace of economic reform in Uzbekistan is proceeding with appropriate speed (question 49). Combining these responses, a plurality of one-third (35%) are contented incrementalists, and an additional 16 percent are content with the pace but prefer quick reform. Twenty-one percent (21%) are impatient for a greater degree of economic reform, while 17 percent report reforms are proceeding too quickly.

We have discussed elsewhere the insufficiency of using demographic characteristics of the respondent to explain positions on key issues of reform, the direction of society, political and economic liberalism (see above). But there is one very significant characteristic of the respondent which can be linked back to a demographic: awareness of the processes going on around them is related to the respondent’s education level.

The information score was calculated simply by counting the instances of "don’t know" responses on the following questions (or expressions of disinterest were available): 22, 27, 29, 30, 31, 36 - 44, 47, 50, 59 - 65, 70, 86, 95. These questions are the most substantive — or perhaps the most abstract — concerning the state. Of these 25 questions, 8 percent had a zero score, meaning they responded "don’t know" to none of the questions. Thirty-six percent (36%) responded "don’t know" on 1 - 3 questions, 35 percent on 4 - 8 questions, 21 percent on 9 or more questions.

The extent of information is a very significant factor in how a respondent perceives the change occurring in Uzbekistan. As discussed above, the "Bewildered" constituency — partially defined by its "no opinion" response on key questions — is numerically important, and a principal source of apprehension regarding the Uzbekistani transformation. The conversion of this constituency into reform supporters is potentially possible with better or more accessible education efforts.

Nationalist sentiment is profoundly important to the explanation of certain attitudinal positions, such as whether the declaration of independence of Uzbekistan is seen as a good thing or a bad thing. The difficulty is that the relevant form of "nationalism" is actually ethnic-nationalism; that is, the assertion of Uzbeki autonomy — so perhaps this isn’t nationalism at all. The strongest "nationalists" — those who have the greatest enthusiasm for the enterprise of Uzbekistani state-building — value their ethnicity above their citizenship. Ethnic Russians in Uzbekistan, on the other hand, evidence greater nationalism in the sense of holding their citizenship in the state above their ethnicity, but in other areas are less supportive of the state-building project.

There are five questions which tap various dimensions of nationalism, albeit not exhaustively to be sure. These five questions were demonstrated by statistical analysis to derive in part from a common underlying attitudinal construct, which we have labeled, with the above caveat, "nationalism."

Seventy-two percent of the population are ethnic Uzbek; 12 percent are Russian; 4 percent are Kazak; Tartar and Qoraqalpoghi account for 3 percent each; other ethnicities total 5 percent (question 108). Asked which is of greater importance, 40 percent cite their ethnicity and 30 percent their nationality, while 26 percent say these allegiances are equally important (question 109). Half (51%) profess to be proud of their citizenship, 39 percent are "content," 6 percent are indifferent, and only 2 percent are malcontented or ashamed (question 115).

Ethnic Uzbek value their ethnicity more than their national citizenship by 48 percent to 23 percent. Ethnic Russians have the opposite priority, 16 percent to 54 percent. Two-thirds of ethnic Uzbeks (62%) express pride in their citizenship, while ethnic Russians are more tepid, with 15 percent rating themselves "proud" and 56 percent "content" with their citizenship.

Two-thirds (65%) are of the opinion the citizens of Uzbekistan should be encouraged to speak the Uzbek language; 29 percent disagree (question 118). Naturally, this sentiment is more prevalent among ethnic Uzbeks (75% support the proposal) than ethnic Russians (35% favor). Only 3 percent of Uzbekistanis report they are planning to emigrate (question 122).

Overall, just 6 percent report they have been the victim of discrimination because of their ethnicity (question 116). Four percent of ethnic Uzbeks report discrimination, versus 14 percent of ethnic Russians. Ethnic Tartars claim higher levels of discrimination (1 in 5), but have too few respondents to be considered statistically significant.

An analysis of these questions finds a very strong common thread in the pattern of responses, yielding our composite measure of Uzbek ethnic identity. Two-thirds (68%) score highly on this scale, 20 percent are weak "ethnic nationalists", and just 13 percent receive negative scores. The temptation is strong to call this a measure of nationalism, since the correlation is high between this scale and other measures of enthusiasm for independence and the nation-building project. The nationalism scale also correlates positively with support for the government.

Eighty percent (80%) of survey respondents say they voted in the December 1995 elections. People with children were more likely to vote than those without children (question 68). Fifty-five percent of Uzbeks say that they are interested in politics and government affairs while 81 percent think it is possible for the government to improve people’s lives (questions 21 & 22). However, 37 percent report that they have only a fair amount of information about political developments and 45 percent say they don’t have much information at all (question 31).

There is, of course, a direct relationship between the level of education attained and the amount of information a respondent has about politics. While 27 percent of those with less than a high school education say they have either a "great deal" or "fair amount" of information about political developments in Uzbekistan, 55 percent of those with some university education or more say the same thing. One in five of those on the lowest end of the educational scale know "nothing at all" about political developments versus one in twenty of those with the most education.

Two-thirds (66%) of the Uzbek people are satisfied with the current level of political freedom while only one in five (20%) say they are unsatisfied (question 36). Three-fourths (75%) of those interviewed say they are satisfied with the electoral system and only 13 percent claim to be unsatisfied (question 41).

Sixty percent (60%) of Uzbeks believe that government officials have gained more power since independence and 39 percent say that those officials are not the same people as before independence (questions 57 & 58). Even though the officials are different, 48 percent say that official corruption is "very" or "fairly" common. Even more (53%) consider the extent of corruption to be serious (questions 59, 60).

A general lack of information is supported by the fact that only 39 percent of those asked knew the name of their Deputy to the Oliy Majlis (question 69). The vast majority (94%) have not received any information from their Deputy about activities in Tashkent (question 71). Seventy-three percent of those who say they have received information, however, say they are satisfied with the amount they have received. This lack of information results in the fact that 42 percent do not know if their Deputy represents their views well and 26 percent say they are poorly represented (question 70).

The plurality of the Uzbek public knows nothing about the Central Election Commission (only 15% know a fair amount or a great deal; question 76). Thirty-four percent say that the CEC is completely neutral (question 77).

Information is also lacking regarding the election laws — a plurality say they don’t know anything about them or if they are in need of reform (question 78 & 79). Seventy-seven percent of the respondents had not heard of the Law on the Guaranties of the Election Rights of Citizens (question 80). However, 58 percent of those that have heard of the law say it has increased the influence of the citizens on the government’s decision-making process (question 80). A full 82 percent expect honest elections in the year 2000 (question 83). Fifty-one percent are definitely going to vote in those elections, and another 25 percent are very likely, suggesting a probable electorate of 75 percent for the 2000 elections (question 82).

As noted, a solid majority of Uzbekistanis (78%) believe the national government in Tashkent has the capability to significantly improve the lives of the people (question 22). A majority regard the President of the Republic to be the level of government having the greatest influence on their lives (the choice of 54%, versus 16 percent who selected their Makhala). A greater majority (69%) consider the President to have the greatest ability to solve the problems of society (questions 23, 24).

In terms of the most desired qualities in a President of the Republic, 90 percent select honesty, 69 percent select efficacy ("a strong leader who can get things done"), 66 percent select concern ("cares about the needs of people like you"). Low on the list are "preserves the old system" (2%), "protects the interests of his family" (7%), "has close ties to the West" (16%), "has close ties to the Muslim world" (20%; question 97).

Currently, ethnic relations in Uzbekistan seem to be in a fairly good state. Only 19 percent of Uzbeks say that there are groups in Uzbekistan, either political, ethnic, or religious, that are causing problems in the society. Fifty-four percent of those surveyed say that there are no groups causing problems while one in four (27%) simply don’t know (question 95). Of those that said some groups were causing problems, 28 percent said those groups were religious in nature (question 96).

Uzbeks seem to be rather favorable to investment by foreign companies with 56 percent saying that it should be welcomed and only 12 percent would rather prohibit foreign corporate investment altogether (question 53). Favorability to foreign investment, however, does not necessarily mean that Uzbeks are "gung ho" about the involvement of multinational corporations in their economy. Seventy-six percent of those surveyed say that foreign companies should not be allowed to purchase or own land in Uzbekistan (question 52).

Forty-two percent (42%) say they would rather maintain the current tax rates and level of services than cut taxes and services (the position of 37%; question 98). When it comes to improving utilities, the people are evenly split (48% - 48%) over their willingness to pay more taxes for better services (question 46). As one would expect, this willingness is directly proportional to the self-identified socioeconomic status of the respondent. While 71 percent of those with a high SES would be willing to pay more, only 29 percent of those with a low SES would be willing to do so. Paying more taxes for better services also seems to be a function of ethnicity. Fifty percent of Uzbeks are willing to pay more while only 1/3^rd (33%) of Russians support this idea.

The people of Uzbekistan seem to be evenly divided over the role of NGO’s in their communities. Overall, Uzbeks are evenly split (41% - 41%) over whether forming groups without government influence is possible (question 99). Family structure seems to play an important role in whether or not someone thinks it is possible to form NGOs. Sixty-one percent of those who are single without kids believe that it is possible to form such organizations as opposed to only 39 percent of people who are married with children. However, 59 percent of the respondents thought that it was appropriate to form such organizations (NGO’s) even though 60 percent did not know of any such organizations in their community (question 100, 102). Overall, Uzbeks are most willing to join a charitable organization than any other, with 48 percent saying they would be willing to do so. On the other hand, only 3 percent say they would join a political party (question 101). Uzbeks are willing to join other groups as well such as women’s groups (25%), environmental organizations (21%), and youth groups (16%).

By far the most important sources of information for Uzbeks are the Uzbek television programs. Ninety-three percent of those surveyed say they use such programs either "often" or "some" (question 32). Seventy-two percent say that they use Russian television programs for information as well. Radio is somewhat less popular with 57 percent listening to Uzbek radio programs and 31 percent listening to Russian radio programs. A majority of Uzbeks (55%) also get information from Uzbek newspapers and magazines. Other forms of communication that are significant include speeches and public meetings (28%) and "friends and family" (89%).

Very few people in Uzbekistan get information from international sources. Seventeen percent use international television, 6 percent use international radio, and 4 percent use international newspapers or magazines.

According to the survey, most Uzbeks seem to believe that the authorities generally respect their rights. Forty-seven percent of the respondents say that since independence authorities have greater respect for individual rights (only 16% say they have less respect) (question 14). Fifty-seven percent say that authorities respect their rights either "a fair amount" or a "great deal" (question 27). One-third (33%) however, say that their rights are respected "very little" or "not at all."

There also seems to be general optimism that the condition of law and order will improve in the next 12 months (60% say it will improve and only 5% say it will worsen) (question 28) . However, that optimism is somewhat affected by the ethnicity of the respondent. While 61 percent of Uzbek nationals expect things to improve over the next twelve months, this is true for only 41 percent of ethnic Russians. Forty-nine percent say that it is not necessary to limit the political and civil rights of the people to establish social order and discipline (question 29). Thirty-six percent say that such restrictions are necessary.

In keeping with what we have seen regarding lack of information Uzbek citizens have about certain topics in the survey, only 29 percent say they have either a "fair amount" or "great deal" of information concerning their rights (61% say they have very little or none at all) (question 30). This lack of information seems to also have an ethnic component as well. Whereas 32 percent of Uzbeks say they have information about their rights, only 9 percent of Russians say the same. There is a gap of 23 percentage points between Uzbeks who say they have no information at all about their rights and Russians who have no information (38% — 15%).

Makhalas are the neighborhood associations (to use an American equivalent) with very long history. Recent legal changes have sought to incorporate Makhalas more into the political structure.

A majority (55%) of Uzbekistanis say that their Makhala is active (34% say it is not active; question 114). Fifty-seven percent say that they participate in the activities of their Makhala (question 110). There is a strong connection between ethnicity and participation. While 70 percent of Ethnic Uzbeks participate, only 6 percent of Russian ethnics do the same. Similarly, 41 percent of Uzbeks never go to their Makhala for help versus 66 percent of Russians (question 111). Of those who had gone to their Makhala seeking help, only 6 percent said the Makhalas usually didn’t help (question 112). As for recent legal reforms affecting Makhalas, 60 percent of Uzbekistanis say that their local Makhala has not been reorganized (question 113).

The majority of the Uzbek public has confidence in the main components of the justice system. Two-thirds have either a "great deal" or "fair amount" of confidence in the courts and the Office of the Public Prosecutor (69% and 68% respectively) (questions 92,93). Sixty percent say they have confidence in the militia (question 94).

The gender split between male and female was 46 percent and 54 percent respectively. From a demographic standpoint, there seems to be very little, if any, difference of opinion between the sexes on most questions (question 6), except for some noticeable propensity of women to express no opinion on questions regarding. The summary group of Bewildered is better than 3-to-1 female.

The survey yielded a young sample with 59 percent of the population below the age of 45 (question 125).

Seventy-two percent of our sample are ethnic Uzbek; 12 percent are ethnic Russian. Other ethnicities were Kazak (4%), Tartar and Qoraqalpoghi (3%), Tajik (1%) (question 108).

A vast majority of Uzbekistanis believe in God (92%; question 119). And the overwhelming majority (87%) belong to the Islamic faith, versus 10 percent who are Orthodox (question 120). While 98 percent of ethnic Uzbeks are Islamic, 72 percent of ethnics Russians ar Orthodox. Other ethnicities are exclusively Islamic.

The plurality of those interviewed had a high school education. Twenty-three percent had 7 to 8 years of schooling while 24 percent had technical training. Seventeen percent had some college education or a college degree (question 126).

The overwhelming majority of the respondents were married with children (74%). One in ten was single with at least one child and 11 percent were single without kids. Only 4 percent reported being married without kids (questions 105, 106).

Only 8 percent of those surveyed were unemployed. Twenty-one percent were pensioners or invalid and 2 percent were students (questions 103, 104). Sixteen percent were housekeepers/homemakers and the balance employed full-time. Fully 57 percent report they work for state-owned enterprise or farm (question 121), indicating how far the economy has to go to achieve a genuine free market (question 103).

Eleven percent of the respondents are collective farmers, the largest occupational group. Ten percent are industrial or construction workers and another 10 percent are specialists in areas like engineering and manufacturing. Four percent of those interviewed were educators.

Most (67%) of the respondents described their economic position as "moderate." Twenty-six percent described their economic status as "low" and 7 percent said it is "high." (question 127). By comparison, the interviewers themselves judged 17 percent as "high SES," 46 percent as moderate, 35 percent as low SES.

When one examines the demographic breakdown of the survey responses, several differences among certain groups become clear. Of all the demographic variables in the survey, ethnicity seems to be one of the most important factors in the way that Uzbeks look at the changes taking place in Uzbekistan. For example, 65 percent of Ethnic Uzbeks say that life since independence is better while only 21 percent of ethnic Russians believe this is true (question 11). Other ethnic groups seem to fall in the middle of these two extremes. Along these same lines, sixty-seven percent of Uzbeks are satisfied with the situation in Uzbekistan versus 51 percent of those of Russian background (question 9). There is more of a disparity when it comes to ranking one’s quality of life. Eighty-two percent of Ethnic Uzbeks say they have a good quality of life versus only 42 percent of Russian ethnics (question 8).

In economic matters concerning the changes taking place in Uzbekistan an "ethnic rift" also becomes apparent. For instance, while 71 percent of Uzbekistanis rate the current economic situation as good while only 41 percent of Russians say this is so – the lowest percentage of all ethnic categories (question 16). As one might imagine, Russians are also less optimistic about the economic situation in Uzbekistan 12 months down the road. A majority (59%) say it will be the same or worse while 77 percent of Uzbeks say that it will be better (question 17).

One’s socioeconomic status also plays an important role in how people feel about life in Uzbekistan. For example, 79 percent of those with high SES believe that life in Uzbekistan has improved since Independence (question 11). Conversely, 59 percent of those with low SES say that conditions have worsened. As one would expect, those with a lower SES are much more likely to rate their quality of life as bad versus those with a moderate to high SES. However, the vast majority of respondents in all three categories of SES say that the Declaration of Independence was a good thing with 85 percent of the total population saying so (question 12).

Where the future is concerned, there is a direct relationship between SES and economic outlook. Fifty-four percent of those with a low SES believe the economy will be better in 12 months and the percentages increase steadily as SES rises (question 17).