|
BACKGROUND
QEV
Analytics was commissioned by the Ukrainian
Congress Committee of America to conduct focus
group discussions in Ukraine on the attitudes of
voters towards the presidential elections and
their informational needs. This report presents
our analysis of the eight focus group
discussions held in Kyiv, Kharkiv and Odessa,
September and October, 1999.
Introduction
In September and October,
1999, a total of eight focus groups were
conducted in three Ukrainian cities, Kyiv,
Kharkiv and Odessa. The purpose was to explore
attitudes towards the presidential election and
to examine the informational needs of voters.
The discussions focused on how voters view
Ukraine’s political system and how they define
their role in the evolving political culture.
In reporting the findings, we
have tried to replicate the substance and the
tone of the group discussions. The quotations
cited in the text are actual comments of
participants, edited for coherence and grammar,
and translated as closely as possible into
colloquial English. The findings are
thematically organized and follow the order in
the moderator’s guide (for a copy of the
Moderator’s Guide, see Appendix, page 20). The
questions listed below represent the issues
explored by participants in the focus group
discussions
Political Landscape
1. What are Ukraine’s main
problems?
2. Who could solve Ukraine’s
problems?
Presidential Election
3. Will the 1999 presidential
election be fair and honest?
4. Will voters participate in
the election?
5. What attributes should
have the president of Ukraine?
Presidential Candidates
6. What do voters know about
the candidates?
7. Are political parties
useful to identify candidates?
8. Is the left-to-right
spectrum meaningful for differentiating
candidates?
9. What information do voters
need about a candidate?
The findings from the focus
groups are indicative of the views and attitudes
of the urban voters, not only of the cities, but
of the regions where the discussions took place.
In terms of demographics, focus group
participants matched the profile of urban voters
in the presidential election, except that focus
group participants were better educated. The
educational difference, however, does not affect
the findings as indicative of urban opinion,
since analyses of survey data have shown that
education is not a definitive factor in
attitudes.
The Washington firm QEV
Analytics designed and analyzed the group
discussions; the research issues were finalized
in consultation with the UCCA New York and Kyiv
offices. The Ukrainian firm KIIS conducted all
aspects of the fieldwork, screening and inviting
participants, as well as organizing and managing
the group discussions.
Funding for the research was
provided by UCCA under a grant from USAID.
data
base
This report is based on an
analysis of eight focus group discussions: four
in Kyiv (September 14, October 22 and 28), two
in Odessa (September 15), and two in Kharkiv
(September 16). A total of 79 individuals
participated, with 9-10 in each group. All were
eligible voters who had at least some secondary
education and were employed at least part time
or were full time students. Four groups
consisted of young adults (aged 18-35) and four
of adults between the ages of 40 and 55.
An experienced moderator led
the group discussions, using a guide
specifically designed for this project.
Participants identified and rank ordered Ukraine’s
main problems, described their attitudes towards
the election and their views of presidential
candidates. The second part of each session was
devoted to test products prepared for the
"Making of the President" project, six
radio and three television announcements
encouraging voter turnout and a brochure about
candidates and the election.
|
Demographic Profile of
Participants |
|
|
Total |
Kyiv |
Kharkiv |
Odessa |
|
Total |
79(100%) |
40 |
19 |
20 |
|
Gender of Participants |
|
|
|
|
|
Male |
33 (42%) |
19 |
7 |
7 |
|
Female |
46 (58%) |
21 |
13 |
12 |
|
Age of Participants |
|
|
|
|
|
18 – 25 |
19 (24%) |
7 |
4 |
8 |
|
26 – 35 |
21 (26%) |
13 |
6 |
2 |
|
40 – 45 |
14 (18%) |
10 |
1 |
3 |
|
46 – 55 |
25 (32%) |
10 |
9 |
6 |
|
Education of
Participants |
|
|
|
|
|
Secondary |
11 (14%) |
9 |
0 |
0 |
|
Technical |
21 (27%) |
12 |
7 |
4 |
|
University |
46 (58%) |
19 |
13 |
15 |
Summary
Below are the most
significant findings that emerge from our
analysis of focus group discussions conducted in
three cities of Ukraine, Kyiv, Odesa and Kharkiv,
in September and October 1999.
Economic crisis dominated as
the country’s main problem, but also
frequently mentioned were the political, social
and cultural crises. Generally, these crises
were seen as interdependent, with the political
structure considered as being at the root of the
economic and the social problems. A few
expressed concern about Ukraine's status in the
international community.
The political crisis was
defined as the failure of politicians to address
the needs of the people and a lack of a vision
of the future. National political figures and
leading parties were not seen as being focused
on solving Ukraine’s problems or as offering
distinct solutions. Although frustrated with the
political structure, almost no one placed
responsibility on a single person or an
institution. Expectations for the future are
quite negative, with most convinced that there
is no one who could solve the country’s
problems. This perception may be at the core of
Ukraine’s failure to move forward, a lethargy
that accepts historical inevitability.
Notwithstanding the palpable
disgust with politics and the universal
expectation that the elections will not
be fair or honest, there was keen interest in
the presidential election. What was even
more surprising, in view of the very negative
attitudes towards politics and elections, was
the widespread commitment to vote: almost every
participant intended to vote on October 31 and
in the second round. From the perspective of
participants these opinions were not
inconsistent: voting was a right of citizenship
and they were proud of this right, although they
did not have a sense of empowerment from voting.
But even more importantly, participants believed
that the best way to thwart election fraud is by
voting, meaning that each voter who cast a
ballot prevented others from using his or her
vote.
Opinions regarding the
presidential candidates were quite soft.
Typically, less than half of the presidential
candidates could be named spontaneously, most
frequently Kuchma, Symonenko, Moroz, Marchuk,
Vitrenko, and Udovenko; others usually came up
only with prompting. None of the candidates were
seen as having a distinct policy identity,
meaning that the participants could not
distinguish how candidates proposed to approach
Ukraine’s problems. There was also little
ideological coherence to a candidate’s image.
Only the two leading candidates had a distinct
ideological identity, Kuchma on the right and
Symonenko on the left. Other candidates were as
likely to be seen ideologically on the left as
on the right.
About six weeks before the
election, many participants voiced concern that
the candidates did not present real choices and
did not offer coherent statements on what they
intend to do when elected. Most participants had
not made up their mind whom to vote for and
almost no one expressed intensively pro or anti
opinions regarding any of the candidates. About
one-third expressed preference for a candidate,
but most wanted more information to make a
decision. These findings suggest that the
electorate tended to be middle of the road and
was not ideologically polarized (and voters
proved this on November 14).
The Kaniv agreement
contributed to a cynicism about the political
process and was seen as a vestige of the Soviet
system, a behind the scenes brokering of deals
that completely ignored the public. To some, the
Kaniv group also illustrated each candidate’s
lack of discernible left, right, or centrist
position and reinforced the prevailing opinion
that the candidates were in the election only
for personal gains, driven by ambition for
personal power.
Yet, taking a step back from
the October 31 election, the focus group
discussions provide evidence of positive
developments in Ukraine’s political culture
and indicate the absence of an organized
system that could give expression to and advance
the interests of voters.
On the positive side, there
appears to be a convergence of political outlook
between ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians.
The political orientations expressed through
these groups varied little among the three
cities, even though the ethnic composition of
the groups did differ. Additionally, ethnic
Russian participants expressed no annoyance that
the promotional materials they reviewed used
only the Ukrainian language. These findings
indicate that ethnic Russians in Ukraine are
embracing their citizenship. The urban society
that is emerging in Ukraine is multi-ethnic,
accepting of Ukrainian as the official language,
and aware of and sensitive to the rights of
individuals.
Attitudes towards government
officials appear devoid of the liberal
democratic concept that elected officials serve
voters. There was no expectation that elected
officials should and could be held accountable
for their actions or inactions. Nor is there a
sense that voting is a form of empowerment.
Frustrations with the political structure have a
passive tone, an acceptance that the government
system is immobilized or is unwilling to
introduce the much-needed political, economic,
and social changes. This passivity of the voters
may reflect a belief in historical
inevitability. The passivity and the sense of
inevitability, however, did not lead to
defeatism, and, on the whole, most participants
were optimistic, convinced that eventually
conditions will improve.
The discussions on who could
bring about change in Ukraine confirmed the
belief that individuals are seen as powerless
and unable to implement reforms in society. The
view that individuals have no personal power, in
some measure, probably determines how
individuals relate to the political process and
underpins their attitudes towards elected
officials. Even on the most fundamental rights
of citizens — the right to vote —
participants did not see that they personally
could do anything to improve the process. Most
were frustrated with the paucity of information
about candidates and wanted to make an informed
decision about their vote, but felt they had no
means and no right to demand information from
candidates.
The evolving political
culture in Ukraine does have the basic elements
needed for a democratic society: an electorate
wanting to make informed decisions and
participating in an election. Turnout in the
second round was 75% of all eligible voters.
However, there is no appreciation of civic
activism as a requisite of a democratic
political system, no understanding that voters
have not only the right, but also the
responsibility, to insist on receiving needed
information and to hold elected officials
accountable.
Also worrisome is the view of
political parties, which are seen mainly as
satisfying personal egos and not as
organizations of like-minded individuals, an
essential feature of a functioning democracy. In
today’s world, a liberal democracy depends on
the organizations that give expression to public
interests: political parties, trade and
professional associations, interest groups, and
community associations. These organizations, to
date, have not become an integral part of
Ukraine’s political structure.
Political
Landscape
In each focus group
discussion, participants were asked to identify
and rank order the most important problems in
Ukraine. As would be expected, economic issues
dominated, but also frequently mentioned were
political, social, and cultural crises.
Economic problems covered a
wide range of subjects: instability in the
domestic economy, low productivity,
unemployment, and stagnation in many economic
sectors. In Kharkiv and Odessa, specific
economic problems were cited, while in Kyiv
discussions were general, broad statements on
the dire economic conditions.
Political problems centered
on the lack of leadership and the failure of the
political system to bring about the changes that
would benefit the public. Many were frustrated
that the political system has not curbed
corruption, prosecuted malfeasance and the
misuse of public funds, or countered fraudulent
activities that allow individuals to exploit the
economy for personal gains. Although no
political leader
or institution was seen as
responsible for the problems in the country, the
political system was seen as being too tolerant
of illegal activities. For example, President
Kuchma was seen as having tolerated Lazarenko’s
way to riches and his escape from the country.
Figure 1. Main Problems in
Ukraine
Focus Groups September
and October 1999
|
ECONOMIC ISSUES |
|
Economic crisis,
instability |
|
Unemployment |
|
Decline in productivity |
|
Reliance on foreign
goods |
|
Excessive tax system |
|
Arrears in wages,
pensions |
|
Lack of implementing
reforms |
|
POLITICAL ISSUES |
|
Maintaining peace |
|
Political instability,
indecision |
|
Corruption |
|
National identity |
|
International status |
|
SOCIAL ISSUES |
|
Lack of good education |
|
Cultural degradation |
|
Lack of social safety
nets |
|
Inadequate health
services |
|
Crime, lawlessness |
|
OTHER |
|
Environmental
protection |
Education and cultural
degradation were seen as the main social
problems. Participants were concerned about the
quality of primary and secondary education and
the unavailability and high cost of textbooks.
One participant noted that education was a low
priority for politicians and illustrated his
comment by comparing the quality of schoolbooks
with publications produced for the 1998
parliamentary campaign. The former were badly
bound on poor paper, whereas campaign literature
was colorful, on top quality paper.
Cultural degradation was a
phrase describing the erosion of values in
society. Specifically: no respect for elders; no
sense of honor; no appreciation of the
intellect; no rewards for accomplishments by
ensuring employment to those who completed
training or to those who have seniority; and
insufficient financial support to cultural
activities and cultural community leaders.
The ranking of problems
generally broadened into a discussion about the
failure of politicians and the political system
to handle the problems of Ukraine. The political
crisis was seen as preceding the economic one
and some viewed the failing economy as
reflecting a lack of political leadership.
Generally, problems were collapsed into three
broad issues, with economic problems in first
place, political in second and social in third
place. This collapsing and ranking was typical
of the older adults (40-55) in the three cities
(Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odessa).
The young urbanites, those
between 18 and 35 years of age, on the whole
agreed that economic problems were the most
pervasive and that the lack of political action
was a reason for the continued economic crisis.
However, they generally were reticent to rank
order problems and reluctant to group economic
and social issues. Opinions of the young also
differed from city to city:
In Kyiv, young adults focused
on peace and stability, defining this as the
need "to deal with issues that threaten our
peace and to ensure that there is no war and
that we have no terrorist acts, such as is
happening in Moscow."
In Kharkiv, the young refused
to rank order problems, agreeing that "a
ranking of issues is impossible since there is a
dependency of economic and political issues;
these are interconnected and cannot be treated
separately."
In Odessa, the young
considered the decline in production as the
foremost problem, followed by political and than
social issues. In fourth place was national
identity, defined in terms of Ukraine’s
international status. The group agreed with the
proposition that the international community has
not fully accepted Ukraine as a separate and
independent state.
The reluctance to rank order
problems may indicate a level of sophistication
in analyzing problems, a sensitivity to and an
awareness of the interdependence of issues.
However, the non-ranking may also be a legacy of
the communist ideology, a totalitarian system
that interprets history in terms of economic
tensions, accepts the preeminence of politics,
and assigns all decision-making in a society to
the Communist Party. The totalitarian mind-set
may inhibit analyzing problems as discrete
segments, of subdividing issues into separate
and distinct areas in order to understand a
process and identify solutions. Participants may
be used to this rigid and structured system for
analyzing social, political and economic
problems.
Respondents were asked who
they consider could effectively deal with the
country’s problems. With one or two
exceptions, most agreed that at the present time
there is no such person or institution. Reasons
given for this pessimistic outlook fall into
four broad areas: the view of government
officials; the understanding of the political
system; perceptions about a vision of the
future; and historical inevitability.
There is widespread distrust
of government officials, a lack of confidence
that has been extensively documented in
nationwide opinion surveys. In the group
discussions, negative attitudes towards
political leaders were tempered by a heavy dose
of cynicism. Most subscribed to the view that
political leaders seek office not for any
general good, but to gratify personal needs and
for personal gains. A young adult in Odessa thus
summarized this view: "many who are in
politics today are doing so for their personal
interests; the problems of others are at the
very bottom of their list." Young urbanites
generally viewed an election as a competition
among ambitious and self-centered individuals.
Participants believed that
political leaders serve only their close
friends, specifically family members, personal
friends, business colleagues, and clan members.
The clan was a candidate’s inner circle,
individuals who came from the leader’s
hometown. A young Odessa urbanite opined that
"the government cannot solve problems since
those in power are dependent on corporate and
other interests. Government officials do not
represent the interests of the public, but are
mainly concerned with the economic sector that
put the leader in power.
Nor did participants expect
that a candidate’s campaign promises should
translate into policies. Platforms of candidates
were seen as serving only one purpose – to win
an election. For example, while acknowledging
that Kuchma did very little to improve
conditions during his presidency, no one faulted
him for touring the country and making new
promises for the 1999 election. It was accepted
that he did this to solicit votes. Even
participants critical of Kuchma did not suggest
that he be grilled on not delivering on past
promises. It should be noted, however, that
these views were not an expression of naivete or
lack of critical thinking. Take for example
participants who said they probably would vote
for Kuchma. Their decision was not simply a
process of elimination, that Kuchma was the most
appealing of the candidates, but a preference
for a middle of the road candidate rather than a
communist or a former KGB leader.
A few participants viewed
power through the prism of the
socialist-communist ideology. An older adult in
Kyiv stated that "the mercantile interests
dictate an election. In Ukraine at this time,
these mercantile interests are the driving force
of individuals who want to assume power."
Almost all participants were
frustrated with the political structure and most
agreed that a president alone cannot solve the
country’s problems and needs support from the
legislature. However, such cooperation was not
seen as happening and most agreed that "at
this time, there is a struggle between the
executive and the legislative branches. The
President and the government cannot find any
compromise with the Verkhovna Rada." The
conflict between the president and the Rada was
extensively discussed by young urbanites in
Kharkiv and Kiev. In Kharkiv, a participant
offered the following solution: "Since the
Rada has too many opponents to reform, the
president could dismiss the Rada and assume all
power for a short time, a few months or half a
year, and bring about the needed changes."
Another frustration with the
political system was that participants did not
see a future-looking leader in Ukraine. This
lack of a visionary generally was part of the
discussion on the need for a clearly defined
ideology to guide policy. An adult in Odessa was
particularly frustrated that Ukraine has
"no ideology to define what we are building
– socialism, capitalism, or an economic system
with a human face?" Generally, communists
were seen as having a clarity of vision, but one
of returning to the previous order, to a
socialist road of development. The need for a
visionary was thus articulated by a young
urbanite in Odessa: "what Ukraine needs is
someone who has a national idea, a vision that
will appeal to and attract the general public.
No one can lead a country out of its problems
until a national idea can be articulated."
Otherwise, many feared that the problems will
persist, political leaders will continue to
defend corporate interests, and eventually
"an oligarchy will come to rule
Ukraine."
Discussions on the conditions
in Ukraine had one notable undercurrent,
acceptance of historical inevitability. The
acceptance of conditions included an expectation
that somehow, sometime conditions will improve.
Some argued that the government and the people
were the same and, therefore, either all or no
one can be blamed for what is happening. An
older participant in Odessa phrased it this way:
"We first have to understand that the
government and the people are one and the same,
that they are in fact two sides of the same
coin. As a matter of fact, the government is the
people."
The few who believed that
someone could resolve the problems in Ukraine
took two very different positions:
In Kyiv, a few agreed that if
Marchuk was elected, he could deal with the
country’s problems.
In Odessa, young adults
believed that a group of individuals "could
band together to handle Ukraine’s
problems." In their view, what was needed
"is not only a visionary leader, but a
group of people dedicated to change and working
together to improve conditions in Ukraine. . . .
A single political leader can be easily put
aside, whereas a group cannot be as easily
removed."
PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION
Almost all agreed that there
would be some fraud in the presidential
election. Participants mentioned the buying of
votes, the stuffing of ballot boxes, and giving
orders on how to vote. Opinions differed in how
extensive would be such practices, but almost
all agreed that these would not affect the
outcome of the election. Participants were
somewhat amused by the expectation that
elections should be fair and honest, maintaining
that politics is universally a "dirty
business" and election fraud is part of the
election process. Typical was the comment that
"even in the much-praised United States,
there are violations in an election" (Kyiv,
older adult).
Comments on vote buying
included many references to the 1998
parliamentary election. According to a Kharkiv
young adult, the cost of a vote in 1998 was
"about 3 hryvna (about 20 US cents). This
amount was frequently given to old ladies along
with instructions for whom to vote." In
Kyiv, however, vote buying took a different form
-- giving gifts and promising future privileges.
The most cynical viewed vote buying as an
inexpensive way to reach voters. One older
participant in Kharkiv defined vote buying as a
subsidy to the poorest segments of society --
"In 1998, individuals who accepted money
for their vote should not be judged; the poor
needed hot food much more than making their own
personal decision on who rules the
country."
As for undue influence on
voters, most cited pressures at the work place.
Not only do managers at a meeting instruct
workers how to vote, "but they made it
widely known that an enterprise will give all of
its votes to one particular candidate" (Kharkiv,
young adult).
The stuffing of ballot boxes
was seen as having the potential to change the
outcome of an election, but only if voter
turnout was low. Stuffing of ballots was
described as a series of decisions and actions.
For example, a veteran of elections in Odesa had
observed that "city commissioners met to
decide what to do about an election; they called
in members of the raion and of the city council
to discuss the election; they met with various
officials and advised on election results. I
witnessed when officials deposited a pile of
ballots for one deputy, this "deposit"
measured about 3-5 centimeters.
These practices were seen as
minimally affecting the election outcome. The
largest estimate was given in Odessa – 30% of
the votes could be falsified. But, the adult
giving this estimate noted, "this could not
happen in the presidential election, because
falsification can only work with a low
turnout."
Discussion on the election
included a few nostalgic comments for the Soviet
period, when elections were a real national
holiday, full of festivities and entertainment.
In comparison, current elections were drab,
overloaded with slogans and posters. These
observations were made in passing and are
reported here because they portray a reality of
today’s Ukraine. In the first round, the mood
of gravity was pervasive; in Kyiv, the stillness
of the city in sharp contrast to its more
relaxed mood on other days or to the excitement
when its soccer team is playing. Maybe this
"non exciting" mood is typical of an
unfolding political culture, which has no
traditions to celebrate a winner or console a
loser.
There were also many comments
on campaign costs – the production of campaign
literature and the travel of candidates. What
participants found particularly irritating was
that candidates had the ability to raise
substantial funds, but not one candidate did or
would use this energy and talent to help the
needy.
With one or two exceptions,
participants did not show extensive
understanding of the election process. In Kyiv,
a few mentioned the mayoral election as an
example of problems and noted that courts got
involved. Nor were international observers seen
as contributing to make the election fair and
honest. In Odessa, for example, the prevailing
view about international observers was that they
contribute to the "intrigues" in an
election.
Virtually every participant
intended to vote in the first round (October 31)
as well as in the second round. Older adults and
participants in Kharkiv and Odesa were more
passionate in their commitment to vote than were
younger adults and residents of Kyiv.
Participants were not committed to any one
candidate, but did have preferences and wanted
more information before making a decision.
Given the palpable disgust
with politics, and the universal expectation
that the elections will not be fair or honest,
the finding on voting intention was somewhat
surprising. However, participants believed that
large voter turnout is the best way to thwart
election fraud -- by voting you prevent someone
else from voting for you. Moreover, voting is a
right of citizenship, and, as one voter said
"it makes us proud." In sum, voting in
Ukraine is an accepted practice, a right that
the electorate wants to protect and does
exercise. Turnout for the 1999 election first
round was 64% and reached a high of 75% in the
second round.
Participants considered
voting a passive political act. Many felt that
voters have no real choice, in part because
little is known about a candidate's platform and
his/her team. The attitude of many participants
was cynicism, about elections and politics in
general, tempered by hope that one day voters
will matter. The Kaniv agreement contributed to
this cynical view: participants saw candidates
brokering deals and ignoring the electoral
process. Typical of this attitude was the
comment that "voting is not for the people,
but for the candidates." An election was
seen as a competitive game, with voters the
judges, and the candidates, the players.
Participants described the
"ideal" president as firm, honest,
truthful, educated, morally and physically fit,
and personally wealthy. They wanted the
president to be a family man, future oriented,
and sufficiently old to be wise, but
sufficiently young to be dynamic. Additionally
they wanted the president "to love
Ukraine" (a phrase used in all groups). A
president had to be a guarantor of the
Constitution and, therefore, had to respect the
rule of law and embrace the emergence of a civic
society.
Equally important were
managerial skills and experience in running an
enterprise. A few wanted a president who owned a
private, successful business. This view was well
argued by a young urbanite in Kharkiv:
"Owners of business are trained in economic
matters and can clearly define their purposes
and responsibilities."
Most agreed that a president
cannot rule alone and needs to bring a good team
to the government ("kommanda") and be
able to work with the legislative branch. In
discussing executive-legislative relations, a
few noted that the Rada (Ukraine’s parliament)
has a strong anti-reform bloc and suggested that
the new President dissolve the Rada and be given
authority to rule for 6 months.
Participants did not agree in
three areas: whether the president must be from
the new guard or the old guard, how important is
membership in a political party, and if
international experience is important. For
example:
Young urbanites divided
sharply between those who wanted to see new
faces and those who favored the old guard since
they had a proven track record.
In Odesa, some of the young
favored a president not affiliated with a party,
but others saw parties as essential and pointed
to the success of such democracies as the U.S.,
England and Germany.
In Kharkiv, young adults were
quite irritated that political leaders kept
going overseas, whereas in Odesa, the same age
group believed it was important that a president
had international standing.
In these discussions on the
"ideal" president there was little
appreciation that the president sets the
direction for the government and is the only
government official elected by all people. Not
surprisingly, discussions on the ideal president
did not address accountability, that a president
has a special relationship with the electorate
and, as their elected official, is responsive
and accountable to the people.
Presidential
Candidates
Opinions regarding the
presidential candidates were quite soft. The
candidates most frequently named spontaneously
were Kuchma, Moroz, Marchuk, Vitrenko, and
Udovenko; a few mentioned Kravchuk, the former
president, and were immediately corrected that
he is not a candidate. Other names came up with
some prompting
Participants have only very
superficial knowledge of the presidential
candidates. None of the candidates had a
distinct image in terms of policies or overall
political and economic values. As a matter of
fact, not one candidate was seen to have a
distinct policy identity. Participants generally
knew only basic biographic data about the
candidates – what positions they had and their
party affiliation. This paucity of information
is not surprising since television news was the
main information source and the stations covered
the candidates in their official positions --
the president, the deputies, the speakers of the
Rada. As a result, participants knew what
candidates did in their official capacity and
not their policies as presidential candidates.
Most could report on
President Kuchma’s travels around the country
and his meetings with national and international
leaders. Symonenko was primarily known as the
leader of the Communist Party and most urbanites
saw him as a leader of the rural population. An
older participant in Kyiv opined that villagers
would vote for Symonenko because most peasants
wanted to return to holkhozes. This assumption
was erroneous, since the village vote went in
greater proportions to Kuchma than to Symonenko.
Marchuk was known as a former member of the KGB
and that he had helped some dissidents in the
Soviet period. Moroz was liked and disliked
because of his actions as a speaker of the Rada.
Udovenko and Kostenko were known as members of
the embattled Rukh party. Vitrenko appealed
because she was a woman and some felt that it
would be refreshing to have a woman at the helm.
She was not seen as an attractive candidate,
mainly because, as one Kharkiv young adult
noted, "her relationships are not the best
. . . and she is far removed from the standards
that we would like to see in a person running
for president."
What was obvious in these
discussions is the paucity of real information
about the candidates and a frustration among the
more informed that the candidates did not offer
real options. A number of participants,
especially the young and particularly in Odesa,
wanted to vote against all candidates, but
realized that by doing so they would not bring
about the needed changes.
Discussions on the role of
political parties were far ranging and no
consensus emerged. In all three cities, there
were strong proponents as well as strong
opponents to political parties.
Opponents saw no useful role
for political parties in a presidential
election. Some felt that parties were the reason
why reforms were not proceeding, referring
mainly to party activity in the Rada. Moreover,
opponents to parties hoped that once a
presidential candidate was elected, he or she
would sever all relationships with a party;
Kuchma’s "no-party affiliation" was
cited as an example of presidential behavior.
In contrast, advocates of
political parties considered party
identification indicative of a candidate’s
overall orientation and of the inner circle of a
candidate, the team of people that will work for
and with a president. To prove the relevance of
parties in a presidential campaign, participants
noted that candidates from a communist party are
pro Russian and pro CIS, whereas candidates from
centrist and center-right parties have a west
European orientation. A young participant in
Kharkiv would not vote for Symonenko because of
his party affiliation, a party that "would
take two steps back and return to
communism." Comments of an older
participant in Kyiv were typical of the overall
pro-party discussions: "In the U.S., a
political party selects and supports a candidate
and, in a way, is responsible for the candidate,
who becomes the party’s leader. Thus, a party
in the U.S. offers a system of accountability.
And in Ukraine – to whom is a candidate
accountable? Take Kuchma – who does he
represent and who can demand accountability from
him? I have nothing against Kuchma, only use him
as an example. What Ukraine needs are
responsible parties; not individuals, single
persons. . . Political parties serve a very
useful purpose – they can be in a position of
responsibility and demand accountability."
A dominant undercurrent in
many comments about political parties was a
general disgust with all of them. One reason for
this negative attitude may be the seventy years
of domination by the Communist party. As one
participant in Odesa said, "Seventy years
of rule by a single party is definitely more
than enough for Ukraine." However, the more
probable reason is that parties competing
currently in Ukraine have not delivered. An
urbanite in Odesa, put it this way:
"Ukraine has many political parties, but
they are unconcerned about the problems of the
people and are only interested in their own
personal gains." This may be one of Ukraine’s
greatest weakness as an emerging democracy --
political parties are seen as serving personal
egos and are not a group of individuals who come
together for a common good.
To get an overview of how
voters saw the overall philosophical orientation
of candidates, each participant was asked to
place candidates on a left-to-right political
spectrum. No questions were raised about a
left-to-right designation, indicating that
participants understood the ideological
configuration.
The table below affirms the
view of many participants that candidates did
not have a clearly defined ideological position
(the table excludes the first two sessions in
Kyiv, since its participants did not record
their placement of candidates on a spectrum).
About one-fourth of the participants could not
identify the ideological orientation of
candidates. Among those who did, the picture
that emerges is quite murky for all but the two
leading candidates, Kuchma and Symonenko. Kuchma
was seen as politically right of center or
center, and only a few placed Kuchma on the
left. Similarly, Symonenko, the leading
communist candidate, was seen as ideologically
on the left (except for a few who placed him on
the right). None of the other candidates had a
clear ideological image. Marchuk straddled both
the left and the right, (as many placing him on
one as on the other side). The two other
communist candidates, Moroz and Vitrenko,
although mainly on the left, were seen by a
number of participants as ideologically on the
right. As unclear were the images of Udovenko
and especially of Kostenko -- slightly more
participants placed these two candidates on the
right than did on the left.
Figure 2. Placement of
Candidates on Political Spectrum
Focus Groups , September and
October, 1999
|
|
Left |
Center |
Right |
|
Bazyliuk |
|
|
|
|
Haber |
|
2 |
|
|
Karmazyn |
|
|
1 |
|
Kononov |
|
2 |
2 |
|
Kostenko |
7 |
2 |
8 |
|
Kuchma |
5 |
7 |
24 |
|
Marchuk |
13 |
3 |
13 |
|
Moroz |
15 |
1 |
9 |
|
Oliynyk |
1 |
1 |
|
|
Onopenko |
3 |
1 |
1 |
|
Rzavskiy |
2 |
2 |
|
|
Symonenko |
28 |
|
4 |
|
Tkachenko |
11 |
1 |
7 |
|
Udovenko |
9 |
|
16 |
|
Vitrenko |
18 |
1 |
13 |
In the two discussions held a
few days before the election, participants did
not have any clearer view of the candidates’
ideological position. For example, Udovenko, the
candidate from Ukraine’s leading centrist
party Rukh, was placed on the left, along with
Moroz and Symonenko.
These findings are presented
not to document voters’ misconceptions or
errors, for the responsibility of a candidate’s
ideological image is with the candidate. Claim’s
that voters may have misunderstood the
ideological leaning of candidates, is further
documentation on the failing of candidates to
send out coherent messages.
Participants considered
biographic data and policy statements as the
information most needed to make an informed
decision. They wanted to know the following
about each candidate: level of education;
professional experience and accomplishments; if
married how many children and what the children
are doing; if family members live abroad and
what they are doing. On policy issues,
participants wanted a clear statement on
objectives and specifics on how a candidate
proposed to carry out the objectives.
Many participants wanted to
know who were a candidate’s close associates,
the individuals who would become part of the
government if a candidate were elected. Many
could speculate on this, but wanted
confirmation. An older participant in Odesa put
this very succinctly: "the team a president
has can give an indication in what direction a
president will lead. Marchuk will be surrounded
by former members of the KGB, Kuchma by people
from Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv, and Udovenko by
residents from Lviv."
In each group, the moderator
asked what question would participants pose if
he or she met a candidate. Three issues
dominated – economic and anti-corruption
policies and attitude towards personal wealth.
Specifically:
How does a candidate propose
to deal with the economic problems and to solve
social inequities, especially the needs of
pensioners and children?
What steps would a candidate
take to curb corruption in the government and to
ensure that his administration was free of
illegal activities?
If the president’s salary
was that of a laborer, would a candidate still
want to be an elected official and how much does
a candidate own, including any overseas
accounts?
Participants felt that the
only way to become informed about candidates was
to meet them face to face. In their view, the
ideal would be to have information in mass
media, especially newspapers and television,
become acquainted with the material, and than
ask questions of a candidate. It was an ideal,
according to participants, since mass media too
frequently lack substantive information. The
quality of political coverage was well summed up
by a young female in Kharkiv who said that media
report "who said what to whom" and
"who met when with whom."
Participants in the focus
groups regularly watched television news and
followed developments in the press. The most
popular television channels were Inter, Studio
1+1, UT1 and UT2. Among newspapers, over half of
the participants read Fakty, a pro-Kuchma
national daily published since 1997. About
one-fourth read Sehodnya, a national
daily that also started in 1997.
Ukraine’s
political culture and the individual
Although the group
discussions focused on elections and the
presidential candidates, many of the
conversations reflected how participants defined
the role and responsibilities of individuals in
Ukraine’s political system. Voters were seen
as observers of political developments, as an
audience watching a show, and not active
participants of the political process. A young
Kyivan thus described how individuals
experienced the last decade: "During
perestroika there was a tremendous amount of
information and we were all very political. We
would run home and watch the screen to hear
statements from the Supreme Soviet, from All
Union conferences and various meetings. …We
listened and studied all the details, closely
following all of the changes taking place. Over
many years we were heavily politicized, but
interest in political issues severely declined
and, understandably, many have become
apolitical." This lack of interest in
politics was attributed mainly to the fact that
very little is currently changing in Ukraine.
The focus group discussions
suggest that voters in Ukraine probably would
reject the proposition that in a democratic
society individuals can bring about change, not
individually but by voting and through civic
activism. Although in Ukraine voting is
exercised with pride, it is a passive act and
does not give individuals a sense of
empowerment. The behavior of voters in Ukraine
suggests that they may be aware of their actual
power, and probably intuitively understand this,
and therefore vote.
Nor did the group discussions
show any appreciation for the role and potential
influence of groups, including organizations as
well as coalitions, that come together to
achieve common objectives. The negative
attitudes towards political parties may be
justifiable by the 70 year single party rule and
the poor performance of parties since
independence. Moreover, the comments of
participants that a political party exists to
satisfy the ego of its leader may be an accurate
reflection of some (if not many) parties.
However, a democratic system of government rests
on political parties, which are an essential
feature of a functioning democracy. Therefore,
the political parties in Ukraine may well need
to review their past and present performance and
find means not only to reach the electorate, but
to persuade voters that they are an effective
means to achieve common goals
Notwithstanding the emergence
of independent mass media and the many
newspapers in Ukraine, there remains a paucity
of information. The problem is dual –
availability and attitudinal. The former is
primarily an economic issue, such as the cost of
newspapers or the support for expanding the
coverage of a television signal. The latter,
attitudinal, is about what voters view as their
rights in terms of information. In Ukraine
voters do not have a sense that they are
entitled to information and can demand such.
This perception is very significant, since
democracy works only when voters can make
rational choices based on a forthright
presentation of information.
Appendix
Note
on Methodology
The project was designed to
explore attitudes towards the presidential
election and to examine the informational needs
of the public. The research issues were
operationalized in a moderator’s guide as a
series of questions that a moderator used to
direct the discussions. Each group was led by an
experienced moderator, who probed for specifics
and sought detailed explanations. To gauge
reactions to communications products,
participants filled out a set of short questions
on each product.
QEV Analytics designed the
research elements of the project – defined the
demographic profile of participants, prepared
the moderator’s guides, the fill-in
questionnaires (on the demographics of
participants and their reactions to the
communications products). QEV Analytics analysts
were present at all discussions and briefed each
moderator on the purpose of the session.
The Ukrainian firm the Kyiv
International Institute of Sociology (Kyiv)
conducted all aspects of fieldwork: screened and
invited the participants, arranged for all group
discussions, and prepared transcripts and
processed the quantified data. A total of 79
participants participated in the discussions in
the three cities – Kyiv, Odessa and Kharkiv.
All participants were eligible voters, employed
at least part-time or in school or training
full-time, had at least 10 years of education,
and were not members of a political party (for
details on demographic profile of participants,
see Tables on pages 3 and 25.
Moderator’s
Guide I
focus
groups in kyiv, odessa, kharkiv
september
14-16,1999
INTRODUCTION
(7 minutes)
Greet participants . . .
We will spend together about
two hours discussing the political situation in
Ukraine. Our purpose is to gain a better
understanding of how voters view the political
process in Ukraine, especially their opinions
and attitudes towards the upcoming election.
We are soliciting your own
personal views and opinions. In this discussion,
there are no right or wrong answers or comments;
different people will have different responses
to a question. Your main task is to feel free in
expressing your opinion. Please feel free to
speak in Ukrainian or Russian.
Our discussion will be
recorded on video; this is done only for
analytical purposes, to make it easier to recall
what was said.
Before we begin the
discussion, let us take a few minutes and
introduce ourselves — please state your name
and briefly tell us something about yourselves.
SITUATION
IN UKRAINE
(15 minutes)
First let us briefly review
the current situation in Ukraine. What do you
consider to be the main problems that our
country currently faces?
LIST
PROBLEMS CITED ON AN EASEL
Which of these do you
consider to be the most serious (rank order
listed problems).
[FOR TOP LISTED PROBLEMS] Is
it possible for the government or the President
to solve this problem? Probe: why/why not?
[Develop views on efficacy of government].
[FOR NEGATIVE PARTICIPANTS]
Could another leader — someone not now in
position — bring about the needed changes?
PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS
(30 minutes)
Other than solving these
problems, what do you want a President of
Ukraine to do or be?
As you are well aware, the
presidential election is scheduled for this
October. Do you expect these elections will be
fair and honest? Why/why not?
Are you going to vote in the
election? PROBE the degree to which voters are
committed to vote. ASK THOSE NOT DEFINITE ABOUT
VOTING — Why?
Next, let’s discuss the
presidential candidates. Who are the candidates
registered for the presidential election? How
well do you know each of the candidates? What do
you know about each of the candidates?
MENTION NAMES OF CANDIDATES
NOT CITED BY PARTICIPANTS — What have you
heard about these candidates?
For the candidates you know,
please try to place each on a political spectrum
from right to left. Is such designation of
candidates meaningful?
Do you need more information
in order to make an informed decision when you
vote?
Which candidates have you
seen on TV?
Suppose I am a candidate for
President of Ukraine. What questions would you
like to ask me in order to decide whether you
would vote for me or not?
What information is most
important for you to know, in order to decide
for whom you are going to vote? PROBE on policy
issues that are mentioned
Do you already know for whom
you are going to vote, or is your mind not yet
made up? [IF MIND MADE UP] Does the party
membership of candidate matter for you? [PROBE
FOR WHY PARTICULAR CANDIDATES ARE SELECTED]
TEST RADIO AND TELEVISION
PROGRAM, BROCHURE (60 min.)
We will now proceed to
evaluate some materials that are being prepared
to bring out the vote in the presidential
election and to ensure that adequate information
is accessible to all voters.
Moderator’s
Guide II:
Kyiv,
October 27 or 28, 1999
INTRODUCTION
(7 minutes)
Greet participants . . .
We will spend together about
two hours discussing the political situation in
Ukraine. Our purpose is to gain a better
understanding of how voters view the political
process in Ukraine, especially their opinions
and attitudes towards the upcoming election and
information sources.
We are soliciting your own
personal views and opinions. In this discussion,
there are no right or wrong answers or comments;
different people will have different responses
to a question. Your main task is to feel free in
expressing your opinion.
Our discussion will be
recorded on video; this is done only for
analytical purposes, to make it easier to recall
what was said.
Before we begin the
discussion, let us take a few minutes and
introduce ourselves — please state your name
and briefly tell us something about yourselves.
SITUATION
IN UKRAINE
(15 minutes)
First let us briefly review
the current situation in Ukraine. What do you
consider to be the main problems that our
country currently faces?
LIST
PROBLEMS CITED ON EASEL
Which of these do you
consider to be the most serious (rank order
listed problems).
[FOR TOP LISTED PROBLEMS] Is
it possible for government to solve this
problem? Probe: why/why not? [Develop views on
efficacy of government].
III.
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN AND ELECTIONS (20 minutes)
How would you describe the
presidential campaign — did it provide you
with information that you need to make an
informed decision on the candidates?
PROBE — what did you learn
from the many political discussions of the last
two or three weeks?
As you are well aware, the
presidential election is scheduled this Sunday.
Do you expect these elections will be fair and
honest? Why/why not?
If there is a problem with
the "honesty" of the election, how
will it occur? Is it in the counting of the
votes? The pressures put on voters? The lack of
access to mass media by some candidates?
Thinking of all the
candidates that you know, please try to place
each on a political spectrum from right to left.
Is such designation of candidates meaningful?
VOTING
in TWO-WEEKS
(15 minutes)
If no candidate wins a
majority, a run-off election will be held in two
weeks. How likely is it that you will vote in
the run-off election?
PROBE — Why not (especially
of those who are indefinite about voting)?
Suppose I am a candidate for
President of Ukraine. In the run-off election.
What questions would you like to ask me in order
to decide whether you would vote for me or not?
INFORMATION
SOURCES
(20 minutes)
What information is most
important for you to know, in order to decide
for whom you are going to vote? PROBE on policy
issues that are mentioned.
Please list all the campaign
advertising which you remember seeing concerning
the election. [FOR EACH] Did you find this
advertisement effective or not? Do you remember
seeing any advertising concerning the importance
of voting? What was your opinion on that
advertising: was it effective in getting people
to vote?
What information sources do
you consider most useful to make an informed
decision about who to vote for in a national
election?
LIST
SOURCES CITED ON EASEL
PROBE for specific media and
include personal sources.
Which of these do you
consider to be the most informative (rank order
listed problems).
What are some reasons the
mass media — television, radio, or newspapers
— did not have the information that you needed
about candidates?
VI.
POLITICAL PARTIES (15 minutes)
Let us now look at political
parties. How would you describe the importance
of the parties in the political process of
selecting a president for Ukraine? PROBE — How
well did political parties do to support their
candidate? What problems did parties encounter?
Do you feel you are voting
for this person because of who they are, or
because of the party they represent? [PROBE FOR
WHY PARTICULAR CANDIDATES ARE SELECTED]
And in conclusion, would
anyone like to predict on how the candidates
will do this Sunday? Who will be the leading
candidates after the vote on Sunday
Questionnaire
Focus groups in kyiv, odessa
and kharkiv – September, October 1999
Please fill-in all of the
questions, placing an "x" in the
appropriate box. The data are only for
statistical purposes.
1. What is your sex?
Male
Female
2. What is your age?
18-25
26-35
40-45
46-50
51-55
3. What is your highest
education level?
Some primary
Completed primary
Some secondary
Completed secondary
Some or completed technical
Some or completed university
Currently a student
What is your employment
status?
Working full time in one
place
Working part-time in one
place
Working occasionally in
different places
Not employed
Student
5. Do you plan to vote this
Sunday in the national election?
Yes, definitely will vote
Yes, probably will vote
No, probably will not vote
No, definitely will not vote
Have not made up my mind
6. Did you vote in the 1998
Rada election?
Yes
No
Do not remember
7. To keep informed about
events and developments in Ukraine, what
information sources do you use on a daily basis?
Newspaper (please name) ____
Radio (please name station
and program) ________________
Television (please name
station and program) _______________
8. Is there anyone in the
news business, like a writer or a commentator,
that you consider especially trustworthy and
whose opinions you value:
Please name and give
affiliation: ______________________
9. How would you describe
your interest in politics and government?
Very interested
Somewhat interested
Not very interested
Not at all interested
10. Are you a member of any
of the following organizations? Please check all
that apply.
Trade union
Professional association
Nongovernmental association
Sports club
Political party
11. What political party or
association, if any, do you feel best represents
the interests of people like you? Please record
name of party or association
Thank you for your
cooperation.
QuanTified
dATA
Focus
Group Discussions
September
and October, 1999
|
Table 1. Participants
Age By City |
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
Kyiv |
Odessa |
Kharkiv |
|
18 - 25 |
19 |
7 |
8 |
4 |
|
26 - 35 |
21 |
13 |
2 |
6 |
|
40 - 45 |
14 |
10 |
3 |
1 |
|
46 - 50 |
16 |
5 |
4 |
7 |
|
51 - 55 |
9 |
5 |
2 |
2 |
|
Table 2. Gender of
Participants |
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
Kyiv |
Odessa |
Kharkiv |
|
Male |
33 |
19 |
7 |
7 |
|
Female |
46 |
21 |
12 |
13 |
|
Table 3. Age of
Participants |
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
Kyiv |
Odessa |
Kharkiv |
|
18 - 25 |
19 |
7 |
8 |
4 |
|
26 - 35 |
21 |
13 |
2 |
6 |
|
40 - 45 |
14 |
10 |
3 |
1 |
|
46 - 50 |
16 |
5 |
4 |
7 |
|
51 - 55 |
9 |
5 |
2 |
2 |
|
Table 4. Educational
Level of Participants |
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
Kyiv |
Odessa |
Kharkiv |
|
Primary |
2 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
|
Secondary |
9 |
7 |
2 |
0 |
|
Technical |
21 |
12 |
2 |
7 |
|
University |
47 |
19 |
15 |
13 |
|
Table 5. Employment
Status of Participants |
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
Kyiv |
Odessa |
Kharkiv |
|
Working Full Time |
46 |
26 |
6 |
14 |
|
Working Part Time |
23 |
12 |
9 |
2 |
|
Unemployed |
1 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
|
Student |
9 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
|
Table 6. Participation
in the 1998 Parliamentary Election |
|
|
|
Total and By City of
Focus Group |
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
Kyiv |
Odessa |
Kharkiv |
|
Yes |
55 |
28 |
14 |
13 |
|
No |
17 |
6 |
5 |
6 |
|
Do Not Remember |
7 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
|
Table 7. Number of
Focus Group Members Indicating |
|
|
|
Readership of This
Newspaper |
|
|
|
Yes |
No |
|
Segodnya |
19 |
16 |
|
Fakty |
44 |
35 |
|
Komsomlskaya Pravda |
5 |
74 |
|
Komanda |
4 |
75 |
|
Kievskiye Vedostmosti |
7 |
72 |
|
VV |
3 |
76 |
|
Trud |
2 |
77 |
|
Odesskiy Vestnik |
2 |
77 |
|
Slovo |
1 |
78 |
|
Uryadovy Kurier |
3 |
76 |
|
Reklama |
1 |
78 |
|
A&F |
8 |
71 |
|
Moskovsky Komsomolets |
3 |
76 |
|
Zerkalo Nedili |
2 |
77 |
|
Pik |
1 |
78 |
|
Yug |
1 |
78 |
|
Verchernaya Odessa |
3 |
76 |
|
Chernomorskiye Novosti |
1 |
78 |
|
Den |
5 |
74 |
|
Business |
1 |
78 |
|
Vercherny Kharkov |
1 |
78 |
|
Gorodskaya Gazetta |
1 |
78 |
|
Vremya |
2 |
77 |
|
Nezavisimost |
1 |
78 |
|
Vercherny Kyiv |
1 |
78 |
|
Kievskiye Novosty |
1 |
78 |
|
Golos Ukrainy |
1 |
78 |
|
Table 7a. Number of
Focus Group Members Indicating |
|
|
|
Reading Fakty |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
Kyiv |
Odessa |
Kharkiv |
|
No |
35 |
8 |
15 |
12 |
|
Yes |
44 |
32 |
4 |
8 |
|
Table 8. Number of
Focus Group Members Listening to |
|
the Identified Radio
Station |
|
|
|
Yes |
No |
|
Nashe Radio |
4 |
75 |
|
Radio Svoboda |
1 |
78 |
|
Gala Radio |
3 |
76 |
|
Radio Nova |
1 |
78 |
|
1st Program – Central
Radio |
7 |
72 |
|
2nd Program – Central
Radio |
1 |
78 |
|
3rd Program – Central
Radio |
1 |
78 |
|
Kievskiye Vedomosti |
2 |
77 |
|
Promin |
8 |
71 |
|
Russkoye Radio |
70 |
9 |
|
Europa + |
1 |
78 |
|
Prosto Radio |
2 |
77 |
|
Utar |
1 |
78 |
|
Odessa + |
1 |
78 |
|
Hit FM |
2 |
77 |
|
Simon |
2 |
77 |
|
Favorit |
2 |
77 |
|
Radio Onix |
1 |
78 |
|
National Radio |
1 |
78 |
|
Golos Kyiva |
1 |
78 |
|
Deutsche Welle |
1 |
78 |
|
101 FM |
1 |
78 |
|
Table 9. Number of
Focus Group Members Indicating |
|
Watching This
Television Station |
|
|
|
Yes |
No |
|
NTV |
13 |
66 |
|
RTR |
9 |
70 |
|
Inter |
54 |
25 |
|
1+1 |
34 |
45 |
|
UT-2 |
21 |
58 |
|
ORT |
7 |
72 |
|
UT-1 |
27 |
52 |
|
Utar |
2 |
72 |
|
TET |
3 |
76 |
|
NTU |
1 |
78 |
|
STV |
3 |
76 |
|
Mist |
1 |
78 |
|
Channel 7 |
3 |
76 |
|
A\TVC |
4 |
75 |
|
Simon |
3 |
76 |
|
ATV |
1 |
78 |
|
Table 9a. Number of
Focus Group Members Indicating Watching TV
Channel |
|
|
Total |
Kyiv |
Odessa |
Kharkiv |
|
Inter |
54 |
27 |
12 |
15 |
|
1+1 |
34 |
20 |
3 |
11 |
|
IV |
2 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
|
UT-2 |
21 |
8 |
8 |
5 |
|
ORT |
7 |
4 |
2 |
1 |
|
UT-1 |
27 |
10 |
7 |
10 |
|
Table 10. Number of
Focus Group Members Indicating |
|
Watching This TV
Program |
|
|
|
Yes |
No |
|
Segodnya |
2 |
77 |
|
Vesti |
3 |
76 |
|
Vremya |
10 |
69 |
|
Podrobnosti |
9 |
70 |
|
Segodnyachko |
1 |
78 |
|
TSN |
11 |
68 |
|
Nuansy |
1 |
78 |
|
Epicentr |
3 |
76 |
|
Vikna |
2 |
72 |
|
Novosti 1/1 |
2 |
72 |
|
7 Days |
1 |
78 |
|
RTN |
1 |
78 |
|
Taboo |
1 |
78 |
|
Fifth Corner |
1 |
78 |
|
Table 11. Number of
Focus Group Members Indicating |
|
Most Relied Upon
Commentator |
|
|
|
Yes |
No |
|
Parfenovich |
2 |
77 |
|
Veresen |
3 |
76 |
|
Mazur |
5 |
74 |
|
Dobrovo |
2 |
77 |
|
Posner |
5 |
74 |
|
Pikhovshyk |
5 |
74 |
|
Dorenko |
4 |
75 |
|
Kiselev |
4 |
75 |
|
Osokin |
1 |
78 |
|
Victoria |
1 |
78 |
|
A. Krivenko |
1 |
78 |
|
V. Moroz |
1 |
78 |
|
A. Kirp |
1 |
78 |
|
N. Mikhalko |
1 |
78 |
|
Y. Makarov |
1 |
78 |
|
A. Lyubimov |
1 |
78 |
|
Mitkova |
1 |
78 |
|
M. Ostapenko |
1 |
78 |
|
V. Dolganov |
1 |
78 |
|
A. Tkachenko |
1 |
78 |
|
V. Tkachuk |
1 |
78 |
|
O. Busya |
1 |
78 |
|
No One |
38 |
41 |
|
Table 12. Level of
Political Interest in Total and By City |
|
|
|
|
Total |
Kyiv |
Odessa |
Kharkiv |
|
Interested |
60 |
31 |
13 |
16 |
|
Not Very Interested |
18 |
8 |
6 |
4 |
|
Not At All Interested |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
|
Table 13. Political
Party That Best Represents Your Interests |
|
|
|
Total |
Kyiv |
Odessa |
Kharkiv |
|
Progressive Socialist |
2 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
|
Communist |
1 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
|
Rukh |
2 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
|
Socialist |
3 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
|
Reform and Order |
1 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
|
Green |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
|
Social Democratic |
2 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
|
Peoples Democratic |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
|
No Party Association |
26 |
9 |
5 |
12 |
|
Do Not Know |
40 |
25 |
8 |
7 |
|
Table 14. Number of
Focus Group Members Indicating |
|
Membership in an
Organization |
|
|
|
Yes |
No |
|
Trade Union |
41 |
38 |
|
Professional
Association |
1 |
78 |
|
Non-Governmental
Organization |
4 |
75 |
|
Sports Club |
13 |
66 |
|
Political Party |
3 |
76 |
|
Table 15. Number of
Focus Group Members Indicating |
|
|
|
Relying on Political
Commentators or Writes |
|
|
|
|
Total |
Kyiv |
Odessa |
Kharkiv |
|
No |
41 |
17 |
11 |
13 |
|
Yes |
38 |
23 |
8 |
7 |
|